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District Court (Cal.) Finds that Utilities are a “Transaction” and, Hence, a “Debt” under the FDCPA and Each Reporting of Credit Triggers a New SofL

In Krejci v. Nat’l Credit Sys., Inc., No. 2:23-CV-06709-MEMF-RAO, 2025 WL 2459350, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2025), Judge Frimpong denied summary judgment, finding that utilities were subject to the FDCPA.

Viewed through the lens of Turner, the Court finds that Krejci’s utility charges constitute a “debt” within the meaning of the FDCPA because it arises from a contractual obligation under a residential lease between Krejci and Parc 410. In other words, the $138.07 debt is based on a transaction involving property intended for “personal, family, or household purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). Krejci states that she and her husband used the apartment “as their family living space.” MSJ at 27; see Bloom, 972 F.2d at 1068–69 (FDCPA does not apply to debts incurred for commercial reasons). Moreover, the statute’s definition of “consumer” is broad enough to encompass Krejci, as she is a “natural person obligated … to pay any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). The closest analogues the Court has found are two California district court decisions holding that rent constitutes a “debt” under the FDCPA. See Dickman v. Kimball, Tirey & St. John, LLP, 982 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1164 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (finding that back rent is a debt under the FDCPA); Gonzalez v. L. Off. of Allen Robert King, 195 F. Supp. 3d 1118, 1126 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (affirming Dickman and holding that an individual obligated to pay rent qualifies as a “consumer” under the FDCPA). Like rent, utility charges also arise from a consumer’s contractual obligation to pay for services under a residential lease. Thus, the reasoning in Dickman and Gonzalez applies with equal force here. NCS cites no binding authority supporting a conclusion different from the one the Court reaches here.

Judge Frimong found that each reporting of the Account to the CRAs triggered a new Statute of Limitations

Krejci initiated this suit on August 16, 2023. See Complaint. Krejci admitted that she received the May 7, 2021 letter from NCS through her sister, informing her that the amount to be collected was $138.07 and that if the debt was not paid after the expiration of a 30-day period, NCS “may furnish information concerning [her] account to consumer reporting agencies (credit bureaus).” ECF No. 62-10, Ex. 1-D. Thus, the earliest violation forming the basis of Krejci’s FDCPA claim was the letter from NCS dated May 7, 2021. Because this alleged violation occurred more than one year before the suit was filed, Krejci’s FDCPA claim is time-barred—unless the Court determines that NCS’s rereporting of the inaccurate account to credit reporting agencies constitutes “discrete violations of the FDCPA.” See Brown, 73 F.4th at 1044. Since the Court must evaluate the debt collector’s conduct from the standpoint from the “least sophisticated debtor,” see Brown, 73 F.4th at 1042, the Court concludes that each reporting was a discrete act that violated the FDCPA as a matter of law. Therefore, any alleged wrongdoing that occurred prior to August 16, 2022, is time-barred because it occurred more than one year before Krejci filed her initial Complaint. This includes the May 7, 2021 letter. However, given that Krejci also rests her FDCPA claim on NCS’s rereporting of the disputed debt, these claims survive to the extent that any rereporting occurred on or after August 16, 2022.

Finally, Judge Frimpong denied summary judgment on the CCRAA claim, premised on whether the debt collector knew or should have known of any inaccuracy. Judge Frimpong (wrongly) allowed the claim to proceed on whether the debt collector should have known it was disputed – a claim that should have been preempted.

NCS cites the same excerpts from Muse’s and Sapp’s depositions and employs the same arguments it made earlier regarding Krejci’s FDCPA argument to assert that, because the depositions show the May 18, 2021 email was never sent, NCS had no way of knowing that there was an inaccuracy with respect to Krejci’s debt. See MSJ at 24, 36; Section VI.B.i. The critical flaw in NCS’s argument is that it relies heavily on Green’s declaration to demonstrate that Muse and NCS followed reasonable protocols and procedures to prevent the type of errors alleged by Krejci. MSJ at 24-26. Nonetheless, because the Court sustained Krejci’s evidentiary objection to Green’s declaration, it cannot rely on it to determine the reasonableness of Muse’s and NCS’s conduct.

 

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