Judge Araceli Martinez-Olguin, in the Northern District of California, partially granted and partially denied a motion to dismiss claims against an online pharmacy benefits manager, focusing on alleged privacy violations stemming from the use of third-party tracking technology (the Facebook Pixel) on its website.
The plaintiff, a user of the online pharmacy platform, alleged that the company’s website embedded the Facebook Pixel, which enabled Facebook to intercept and receive detailed information about users’ interactions with the site—including personal and medical data—without user consent. The plaintiff claimed this data sharing violated federal and California privacy laws, including the Wiretap Act, the California Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA), and the California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CMIA).
The plaintiff sought to represent a nationwide class of users whose data was allegedly shared with Facebook, as well as a California subclass.
Pleading Deficiencies – Wiretapping Claims
As Express Scripts highlights, Lynch alleges in paragraph 75 that “[t]he Facebook Pixel thereafter surreptitiously intercepted and transmitted in real time to Facebook, without Plaintiff’s prior knowledge or consent, a variety of private communications between Plaintiff and Defendant.” SAC ¶ 75. Other paragraphs, however, allege Express Scripts intercepted those communications. In paragraph 83, Lynch alleges “Defendant’s use of the Facebook Pixel to intercept Plaintiff’s electronic communications and share them with Facebook was not instrumental or necessary to Defendant’s provision of any of its goods or services.” Id. ¶ 83. Paragraph 84 likewise alleges “Defendant utilized the Facebook Pixel to intercept the substance of Plaintiff’s … electronic communications intentionally and contemporaneously share the information with Facebook, including mouse clicks and movements, keystrokes, search terms, information inputted, pages and content viewed, scroll movements, and copy and paste actions.” Id. ¶ 84. Paragraph 119 similarly attributes the interception to Express Scripts: “Defendant intercepted and recorded the Class Member’s electronic communications without … knowledge or consent.” Id. ¶ 119. In light of these inconsistent allegations, Lynch has once again failed to provide Express Scripts fair notice of the conduct giving rise to the federal and state wiretapping claims pleaded in the operative complaint.
But for this pleading deficiency, however, Lynch’s allegations otherwise withstand Express Scripts’ pleading challenges.
Because of these inconsistencies, on which party was responsible, the court dismissed the federal and state wiretapping claims but granted the plaintiff leave to amend.
Medical Information Confidentiality
The court allowed the plaintiff’s claim under CMIA to proceed. The plaintiff plausibly alleged that medical information—such as prescription details and diagnosis history—was shared with Facebook via the Pixel, and that this information was “viewed” by Facebook in the course of building advertising profiles. The court found these allegations sufficient to meet the statutory requirements for a breach of medical confidentiality at the pleading stage.
Consent and Privacy Disclosures
The defendant argued that users had consented to the data sharing through acceptance of the website’s privacy policy and terms of use. The court rejected this argument, finding that the disclosures were too general to establish actual, informed consent to the specific conduct alleged—namely, the sharing of sensitive health information with third parties for advertising purposes. The court emphasized that, at the motion to dismiss stage, only disclosures that unambiguously notify users of the specific data practices at issue can defeat privacy claims as a matter of law.
Consent “can be [express] or implied, but any consent must be actual.” Calhoun v. Google, LLC, 113 F.4th 1141, 1147 (9th Cir. 2024) (internal citations and quotations omitted; modification in original). “For consent to be actual, the disclosures must ‘explicitly notify’ users of the conduct at issue.” Id. (citation omitted). “[C]onsent is only effective if the person alleging harm consented ‘to the particular conduct, or to substantially the same conduct’ and if the alleged tortfeasor did not exceed the scope of that consent.” Id.
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Here, the disclosures on which Express Scripts relies are not sufficient to establish consent at the pleading stage. The company describes the disclosures “throughout the Privacy Policy a[s] more than adequate to put a reasonable person viewing those disclosures on notice that Express Scripts uses website enhancement technology, including pixels on certain pages within its domain; that the record data collected from this technology may be shared with third parties; and that the technology is used to promote site functionality and for marketing.” Mot. at 18. These generalized disclosures are insufficient to resolve the issue of consent as a matter of law on the pleading stage. See Calhoun v. Google, 526 F. Supp. 3d 605, 620 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (explaining, on a motion to dismiss, that “[t]he disclosures must have only one plausible interpretation for a finding of consent.”).
JONATHAN LYNCH, Plaintiff, v. EXPRESS SCRIPTS HOLDING COMPANY, Defendant., No. 23-CV-01170-AMO, 2025 WL 2224419 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2025).
