Judge Kymberly K. Evanson, of the Western District of Washington, granted defendant's motion to dismiss. The court held that plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient to demonstrate the threshold issue of Article III standing.
Background. Hutton brought a putative class action under Washington’s Commercial Electronic Mail Act and Consumer Protection Act, alleging that Papa John’s sent Washington consumers marketing emails with false or deceptive subject lines. Papa John’s removed the case to federal court, where the court addressed Article III standing before the merits.
The Court’s Analysis. The court held that Hutton alleged only a statutory violation, not a concrete injury. The complaint did not allege that “he took any action (opening, reading, deleting, etc.) with respect to the emails or was otherwise aware of or harmed by their existence.” The court declined to infer those facts from general allegations that Papa John’s “bombarded” consumers with emails.
In this case, Hutton does not allege that the Papa John's emails were unsolicited, nor does he allege that he took any action (opening, reading, deleting, etc.) with respect to the emails or was otherwise aware of or harmed by their existence. And unlike the Harbers plaintiff, Hutton does not allege that the Papa John's emails deceived him. See 415 F. Supp. 3d at 1010. In the absence of such allegations indicating that Hutton suffered a concrete injury, Hutton's complaint has alleged a merely “technical or procedural violation that by itself does not manifest concrete injury[.]” Atkinson v. Penney OpCo LLC, No. 23-cv-1806-BJR, 2024 WL 3579910, at *2 (W.D. Wash. July 30, 2024). Because “Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation[,]” the Court finds that merely alleging a CEMA violation is insufficient to allege a concrete injury to Hutton. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341. Even if Hutton has adequately pleaded a CEMA claim, his suit cannot proceed in federal court without an Article III injury. See id. (“[A] plaintiff [does not] automatically satisf[y] the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.”).
*3 Recently, a court in this district, as well as courts in other districts considering similar claims, have concluded that plaintiffs in similar actions have failed to allege an injury in fact sufficient to satisfy Article III. See, e.g., Carter v. Vineyard Vines, LLC, No. ELH-25-3178, 2026 WL 1429258, at *23 (D. Md. May 21, 2026) (remanding a case brought under Maryland analogues to CEMA and the CPA, finding no concrete injury); Nuri v. True Religion Apparel, No. 2:25-cv-00690-LK, 2026 WL 864886 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 30, 2026). Other courts have, however, disagreed. See, e.g., Liss v. Skechers USA Inc., No. 3:25-cv-05861-DGE, 2026 WL 1392327, at *2–3 (W.D. Wash. May 19, 2026). In Liss, the court reasoned that because the plaintiffs failed to allege that they consented to receive emails from the defendant, the plaintiffs thereby objected to the “annoyance and harassment” caused by misleading unsolicited emails, which is similar to an invasion of privacy that constitutes a concrete harm. Id.
Because a removed action must be remanded when the plaintiff lacks Article III standing, the court remanded the case to Snohomish County Superior Court and denied the pending motion to dismiss as moot.
Hutton v. Papa John's USA, Inc., No. C25-1922-KKE, 2026 WL 2210133 (W.D. Wash. July 31, 2026).
